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STARTUP LAWYERING 2.0* 
JOHN F. COYLE** & JOSEPH M. GREEN*** 
This Article describes the day-to-day work of lawyers who advise 
startup companies. Drawing upon interviews with practicing 
attorneys in New York City and the Research Triangle of North 
Carolina, it distinguishes the practice of startup lawyers from the 
practice of other types of corporate lawyers. In so doing, the Article 
aspires to update and expand upon a sociological study published 
in 1996 that described the distinctive character of the work 
performed by startup lawyers in Silicon Valley. This earlier study 
provides an account of what we call “Startup Lawyering 1.0.” In 
this Article, we describe the work of startup lawyers outside of 
Silicon Valley circa 2016. In so doing, we provide an account of 
what we call “Startup Lawyering 2.0.” 
We first describe how startup lawyers serve as transaction cost 
engineers by preparing prepackaged documents, by utilizing 
standard forms, and by providing nonlegal advice to their clients. 
We then show that startup lawyers serve as reputational 
intermediaries by screening clients and by vouching for them with 
investors. We also show that startup lawyers serve as regulatory 
compliance experts, transmitters of norms, and designers of 
innovative billing schemes.  
We further argue that West Coast norms of startup lawyering have 
migrated to other startup ecosystems in the United States. The key 
distinction for lawyering practice in the startup space today, we 
argue, relies less on geography and more on whether a lawyer is 
what we call a “startup law aficionado.” Startup law aficionados 
can be found in any geographical region, though they tend to be 
clustered in technology hubs. Silicon Valley is still such a center of 
gravity in the startup world that startup law aficionados outside the 
Bay Area will inevitably come into contact with Silicon Valley 
startup lawyers and venture investors. As this occurs, the lawyering 
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practices of startup law aficionados outside of Silicon Valley 
increasingly reflect those of their counterparts in Silicon Valley—
and repeated exposure only increases the effect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Startup lawyers are lawyers who represent early-stage companies as 
these startups seek to raise capital and grow their businesses.1 In many 
respects, the work performed by startup lawyers resembles the work of a 
traditional corporate lawyer. They draft contracts, negotiate with 
opposing counsel, and generally seek to facilitate transactions that their 
clients wish to pursue. In a number of other respects, however, the work 
 
 1. In this Article, we use the term “startup” to refer to an early-stage technology 
company with the potential for rapid and scalable growth that might plausibly seek to raise 
money from a venture capital fund and return the fund’s investment in connection with a 
liquidity event, such as a sale of the company to a strategic acquirer or an initial public 
offering. The term does not encompass businesses that would be unlikely to attract 
institutional venture capital investment, such as so-called “cash-flow” or “lifestyle” 
companies. See Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Essay, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe-
SAFE, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 175–76 (2016). Whereas the primary goal of a startup is 
to provide an outsized return to its investors, the primary goal of a lifestyle company is to 
provide a good income to its founders. See id. Facebook, in its early days, is a good example of 
what we mean by startup. A restaurant or a graphic design firm is a good example of what we 
consider cash-flow or lifestyle companies. 
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performed by these attorneys is quite different from the work of 
traditional corporate lawyers. Startup lawyers often represent founders 
who have little to no experience running a business. They must 
sometimes wait for months—or even years—to be paid. And they are 
often asked to introduce their clients to potential investors, a task that 
typically falls to investment bankers in more traditional corporate deal 
making. 
In this Article, we paint a portrait of startup lawyering circa 2016. In 
so doing, we update and expand upon the work of Mark Suchman and 
Mia Cahill, the authors of a leading sociological account of startup 
lawyering published in 1996.2 We refer to this descriptive account by 
Suchman and Cahill as “Startup Lawyering 1.0.” This account of startup 
lawyering has cast a long shadow over the academic literature. It was 
and still remains the seminal work in the field.3 To date, however, 
scholars have not sought to determine whether the work of startup 
lawyers has changed in the years since the study was first published. Nor 
have scholars sought to determine whether this account of startup 
lawyering accurately describes the work performed by lawyers who 
represent early-stage companies outside of Silicon Valley.4 
This Article updates and expands upon this prevailing account of 
startup lawyering. In so doing, it offers an account of what we call 
 
 2. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the 
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679 (1996). 
Drawing upon interviews with Silicon Valley lawyers, Suchman and Cahill observed that 
startup lawyers facilitated venture capital transactions in three ways. First, the lawyers did not 
insist that their startup clients pay for services when rendered. Id. at 691–92. Instead, they 
would defer fees for unfunded companies or take equity in lieu of cash. Id. at 692. Second, 
these attorneys enforced a normative order that increased the stability of the local venture 
capital market. Id. at 697. They refused to take clients who might challenge the community’s 
assumptions, indoctrinated their clients into the routines of the local business community, and 
steered startups to appropriate investors. Id. at 698–702. Third, these attorneys developed 
local norms that created a shared frame of reference for attorneys practicing in Silicon Valley. 
Id. at 703. They then sought to export these norms to other jurisdictions. Id. at 703, 705–08. 
 3. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997 WIS. L. 
REV. 503, 513 (describing Suchman and Cahill’s article as “incredibly rich, both in detail and 
interpretation”); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Why the Law of Entrepreneurship Barely Matters, 31 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 701, 701 n.1 (2009) (listing Suchman and Cahill’s article as one of the few 
that addresses “the intersection of law and entrepreneurship”). Occasionally, scholars will cite 
an earlier (and much shorter) article that reaches some of the same conclusions. See generally 
Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A 
Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555 (1989) (discussing the relationship between Silicon Valley 
lawyers and the growth of the tech industry). 
 4. The sole exception would appear to be a 2014 article by Abe Cable in which he noted 
that the model of startup lawyering pioneered by firms in Silicon Valley had spread to other 
jurisdictions, such as Seattle and Boston. Abraham J.B. Cable, Startup Lawyers at the 
Outskirts, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 163, 165 (2014). 
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“Startup Lawyering 2.0.” The Article first assesses whether the 
lawyering style described by Suchman and Cahill has evolved over time. 
Is the practice of startup lawyers today meaningfully different from the 
practice of startup lawyers in the early 1990s? Or is contemporary 
practice broadly similar? It then seeks to determine whether the model 
they describe varies by geographical location. Do lawyers who represent 
startups in other parts of the country behave in ways that are broadly 
similar to their Silicon Valley counterparts? Or are there regional 
variations in the ways that startup lawyers behave? 
To answer these questions, we conducted interviews with startup 
lawyers in two regions—New York City and the Research Triangle in 
North Carolina—in the late summer and early fall of 2016.5 Overall, we 
conducted sixteen interviews. We interviewed nine attorneys in North 
Carolina and seven attorneys in New York. Each attorney interviewed 
was a law firm partner or senior lawyer who has worked extensively with 
entrepreneurial clients over a period of many years.6 The insights 
gleaned from these interviews suggest that the descriptive account of 
startup lawyering developed by Suchman and Cahill twenty years ago 
remains broadly accurate. In several respects, however, we uncovered 
evidence that the portrait of startup lawyering painted by Suchman and 
Cahill does not fully capture the nuances of contemporary startup 
lawyering outside of Silicon Valley circa 2016. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a brief overview of 
venture capital in the United States. Part II then describes the various 
roles that startup lawyers play in contemporary practice and reviews the 
 
 5. We chose to focus our research on New York City and the Research Triangle as 
representative examples of large and small East Coast tech hubs, respectively. New York has 
grown to be the second-largest tech hub in the United States, second only to the San 
Francisco Bay Area (which includes Silicon Valley and San Jose). See PITCHBOOK DATA, 
INC., US VENTURE ECOSYSTEM: FACTBOOK 5 (2016), https://files.pitchbook.com/pdf
/PitchBook_2016_US_Venture_Ecosystem_FactBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY6L-VDXS]. 
The Research Triangle, including the cities of Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill in North 
Carolina, has long been a hub for life sciences companies and technology startups, but unlike 
New York, remains a small and somewhat isolated startup ecosystem. See Region’s Vibrant 
Entrepreneurial Environment Boosts Jobs and Investment, RES. TRIANGLE REGION, http://
www.researchtriangle.org/news-and-events/regions-vibrant-entrepreneurial-environment-boosts
-jobs-and-investment [https://perma.cc/FW75-SX9V]; see also Renee Morad, 10 Biotech Firms 
Rapidly Expanding in North Carolina, BIOSPACE (July 21, 2015, 5:01:57 AM), http://www
.biospace.com/News/10-biotech-firms-rapidly-expanding-in-north/384976 [https://perma.cc
/B533-HMVS]. We also chose these hubs because one of us is based in New York and the 
other in Chapel Hill, so our networks yielded the greatest number of experienced startup 
lawyers for us to interview in these locations. 
 6. On a number of occasions, the interviewee had previously practiced in Silicon Valley 
and therefore was well positioned to explain the difference in practice between Silicon Valley 
and the jurisdiction where he or she currently practices. 
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similarities and differences found in these practices in different 
geographical locations. Part III discusses the migration of Silicon Valley 
startup lawyering norms to East Coast startup ecosystems and 
introduces the concept of the “startup law aficionado.” 
I.  THE GEOGRAPHY OF VENTURE CAPITAL IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the decades after the Second World War, there emerged two 
primary technology startup hubs in the United States: Silicon Valley in 
Northern California and the Route 128 Corridor near Boston, 
Massachusetts.7 Both of these tech clusters produced large quantities of 
venture-backed startups in a variety of technology sectors but 
predominantly in three areas: (1) hardware, (2) software/internet, and 
(3) life sciences.8 During the dot-com boom in the late 1990s, other 
metropolitan areas developed nascent tech hubs. Cities such as Seattle, 
Washington (home of Microsoft); Austin, Texas (home of Dell); and 
New York City (which became known at the time as Silicon Alley) had 
fast-growing tech ecosystems until the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 
2001.9 
Coming out of the Great Recession into the Web 2.0 era, many of 
these secondary startup ecosystems experienced a resurgence in startup 
and venture capital activity. By 2016, New York City had largely 
overtaken Boston as the second-largest tech hub in the country.10 
Metropolises such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., 
joined Austin and Seattle as significant tech hubs.11 During this latest 
startup boom, many Silicon Valley startups and larger technology 
companies began migrating from Silicon Valley to San Francisco,12 
creating a massive technology hub encompassing the San Francisco Bay 
Area, which now constitutes the largest technology cluster in the world 
by a significant margin.13 
 
 7. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION 
IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 11 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure 
of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to 
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 588–89 (1999). 
 8. See Mary J. Dent, A Rose By Any Other Name: How Labels Get in the Way of U.S. 
Innovation Policy, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J., no. 2, 2011, at 128, 128, 134. 
 9. See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-
ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 177 n.161 (2003). 
 10. See PITCHBOOK DATA, INC., supra note 5, at 5. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Jenny Belotserkovsky, Why San Francisco Is the New Tech Titan, Not Silicon Valley, 
GEEKTIME (June 8, 2016), http://www.geektime.com/2016/06/08/why-san-francisco-is-the-new
-tech-titan-not-silicon-valley/ [https://perma.cc/3V7A-EX6D]. 
 13. See PITCHBOOK DATA, INC., supra note 5, at 5. 
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Smaller hubs that have long had local startup ecosystems also 
expanded during this period. Examples of these smaller hubs include 
places such as Boulder, Colorado; Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina (known collectively as the Research Triangle); and San 
Diego, California.14 While the Bay Area still has startups representing 
every imaginable sector of the technology industry, many other 
ecosystems tend to be more densely populated by startups from 
particular tech sectors. For example, Boston, San Diego, and the 
Research Triangle have significant clusters of life sciences companies.15 
New York, in contrast, has fewer life sciences startups, but a large 
number of startups melding technology (software, in particular) with the 
industries that have long dominated New York City’s economy: finance, 
advertising, media, and professional services.16 
These hubs vary across a number of different dimensions beyond 
the sectors in which their startups compete. More mature hubs, such as 
the Bay Area and Boston, have a greater number of startups that have 
grown into large, prosperous public companies.17 They also have far 
more institutional venture capital firms (“VCs”) headquartered within 
the vicinity than the other hubs.18 Furthermore, a number of the 
entrepreneurs and early employees of the more mature ecosystems have 
become serial entrepreneurs and/or angel investors.19 That kind of 
virtuous cycle is present to a lesser extent in less mature startup 
ecosystems, even those that have grown tremendously of late, such as 
New York. 
Just as these various geographical clusters differ in size, presence of 
local capital for early-stage ventures, maturity of companies, and sectors 
 
 14. Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60, 95–96 (2011). 
 15. See JONES LANG LASALLE IP, INC., LIFE SCIENCES OUTLOOK 3 (2015), http://www
.us.jll.com/united-states/en-us/Documents/Life-Sciences/JLL-US-Life-Science-Outlook-2015
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW7M-2G8B]. 
 16. Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 
861, 874 (2016). 
 17. See SAXENIAN, supra note 7, at 12–27 (describing the growth and development of 
Boston and Silicon Valley and some of their respective companies). 
 18. See Tanya Benedicto Klich, VC 100: The Top Investors in Early-Stage Startups, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/242702 [https://perma
.cc/8YB6-UV8H]; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. 
L.J. 283, 283–84 (2013). 
 19. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 292 n.35 (2013) 
(citing Ari Levy, ‘PayPal Mafia’ Gets Richer, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-21/paypal-mafia-gets-richer [https://perma.cc
/2H76-UWC3]). Angel investors are “wealthy individuals who personally finance the same 
high-risk, high-growth start-ups as venture capitalists but at an earlier stage.” Darian M. 
Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1406 
(2008). 
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represented, so too are there differences in the types of startup 
lawyering found in these technology hubs. A startup lawyer representing 
a life sciences company founded by a professor at North Carolina State 
University will face a different set of challenges than a startup lawyer 
representing a software company founded by a college student at New 
York University. To date, most accounts of startup lawyering have 
generally treated it as monolithic.20 In the next Part, we show that while 
there are broad similarities in startup lawyering practice in the United 
States, there are also some noteworthy differences in practice based on 
geographical location. 
II.  COMMON THREADS IN STARTUP LAWYERING 
In theory, a company could draft and negotiate all of its contracts 
without the assistance of outside counsel. In practice, it is common for 
companies to hire corporate attorneys to assist with both contract 
drafting and contract negotiation. In performing these services, 
corporate attorneys do not prepare legal briefs, appear in court, or 
engage in the practice of law as it is commonly understood.21 Instead, 
they perform a variety of tasks that could be performed by someone 
who lacks a law degree.22 A question that has long preoccupied legal 
scholars, therefore, is what value do corporate lawyers add to the 
transaction so as to justify their hefty billing rates?23 Or, to put it another 
way, why do companies continue to hire corporate lawyers to perform 
tasks for which no law license is required? 
Legal scholars have developed three paradigms that seek to answer 
this question.24 The first paradigm suggests that corporate lawyers serve 
as “transaction cost engineers.”25 On this account, corporate lawyers 
minimize transaction costs by drafting contracts that assign specific legal 
risks to the party that is best positioned to bear them.26 A commonly 
 
 20. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 21. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional 
Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 399 (2015) (“Unlike the litigation context, in which the lawyer’s 
role qua lawyer is clear in the public imagination, transactional lawyers are often accused of—
or congratulated for—not being lawyers at all.”). 
 22. See id. (noting that some firms label their corporate attorneys as “advisers, deal-
makers, or business planners”). 
 23. See Martha Neil, Top Partner Billing Rates at BigLaw Firms Approach $1,500 Per 
Hour, ABA J. (Feb 8. 2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/top_partner
_billing_rates_at_biglaw_firms_nudge_1500_per_hour/ [https://perma.cc/VQ65-98BT] (noting 
the steady rise of hourly rates at some of the nation’s biggest law firms). 
 24. See de Fontenay, supra note 21, at 399–401 (describing the three paradigms). 
 25. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243, 255 (1984). 
 26. See id.  
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cited example of such engineering is the representations and warranties 
section that is typically found in merger agreements.27 The second 
paradigm holds that corporate lawyers add value to transactions by 
serving as “reputational intermediaries.”28 On this account, the law firm 
effectively “rents” its good name to clients about which little 
information is available.29 Thereafter, potential counterparties are more 
willing to deal with the client—or to offer the client better terms—
because these counterparties trust the law firm that is representing it.30 
The third paradigm posits that corporate lawyers add value to 
transactions by acting as “regulatory compliance experts.”31 On this 
account, transactional lawyers add value by “providing expertise in the 
law and regulations that generally govern the transaction and by 
understanding the rationale for the contractual provisions in the 
transaction documents.”32 In contrast to the first two paradigms, which 
suggest that lawyers add value by performing services that could—in 
theory—be performed by any sophisticated actor in the marketplace, 
this paradigm suggests that the value added by lawyers is attributable 
principally to their skills as lawyers.33 
It should be emphasized that these three paradigms are not 
mutually exclusive. A corporate lawyer may add value by working as a 
transaction cost engineer and by serving as a reputational intermediary 
and by acting as a regulatory compliance expert. Indeed, a review of the 
existing literature suggests that startup lawyers in Silicon Valley are 
often described as adding value in each of these ways.34 While corporate 
 
 27. See id. at 259–60. The purpose of these representations and warranties, Gilson argues, 
is to “remedy conditions of asymmetrical information in the least-cost manner.” Id. at 269. By 
requiring the seller to represent that certain facts are true, and by requiring the seller to 
indemnify the buyer if these facts turn out not to be true, these provisions incentivize the 
seller—the party who can acquire this information at the lowest cost—to disclose any and all 
relevant facts to the buyer. Once these disclosures are made, Gilson argues, the buyer is more 
likely to proceed to closing because it is no longer worried that it is overpaying for the assets. 
See id. at 270–71. Gilson also identifies an “earnout” provision as a contractual device that 
facilitates the consummation of a transaction when the parties disagree as to the future 
prospects of the business. See id. at 263–64. 
 28. See de Fontenay, supra note 21, at 400. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 400–01. 
 31. See de Fontenay, supra note 21, at 401. 
 32. Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 486, 501 (2007). 
 33. See id. at 501–02. 
 34. See Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Costs Engineer?, 74 OR. 
L. REV. 239, 245–51 (1995) (describing the various means—both contractual and relational—
by which Silicon Valley lawyers may reduce transaction costs in venture capital financings); 
Cable, supra note 4, at 168–70 (arguing that Silicon Valley lawyers play an important role as 
reputational intermediaries); see also D.E. Wilson, Jr. & Andrew E. Bigart, AML 
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lawyers may also provide value in a manner that is not fully captured by 
any of these paradigms, they provide a useful framework to evaluate the 
value added by the particular species of corporate lawyers—startup 
lawyers—that is our focus in this Article. 
A. Startup Lawyers as Transaction Cost Engineers 
In its most narrow and formalistic sense, the transaction cost 
engineer paradigm emphasizes the role of contractual innovations 
pioneered by lawyers that help their clients close value-enhancing deals 
that would not have occurred if not for the attorney’s involvement.35 The 
paradigm is, however, broad enough to encompass other lawyering 
activities that reduce costs in the context of venture capital transactions. 
In particular, contemporary startup lawyers serve as transaction cost 
engineers by (1)	developing sets of prepackaged documents that cover 
formation and basic financing, (2)	promulgating standard forms for 
financing transactions, and (3)	explaining the mechanics and dynamics of 
financing transactions to their clients. 
1.  Prepackaged Documents 
Increasingly, law firms that regularly represent startups offer a 
“prepackaged” set of documents that allow their clients to incorporate, 
secure funding from friends and family, and hire employees and 
incentivize them with stock options.36 In some markets—including New 
York, Boston, and Silicon Valley—some law firms are now giving the 
forms away for free.37 In other markets, the cost of these packages is 
nonzero but still generally affordable for early-stage companies.38 The 
increased availability of these documents reduces the legal costs that are 
often associated with launching a startup. In this respect, this 
 
Considerations for the Fintech Industry, VENABLE LLP (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.venable
.com/aml-considerations-for-the-fintech-industry-12-10-2015 [https://perma.cc/94TQ-95PT 
(staff-uploaded archive)] (explaining the importance of regulatory compliance in regards to 
anti-money laundering risks for Silicon Valley industries). 
 35. See de Fontenay, supra note 21, at 400.  
 36. See Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm II, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 
22, 2016) (“Our legal docs are prepackaged. We have form articles, bylaws, and the works. 
The only case where this isn’t true relates to licenses.”) (notes on file with authors); Interview 
with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm IV, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 24, 2016) (“There has 
been such a commodification of startup work here. We were the leaders in 2006 in developing 
a prepackaged set of startup documents. Now, everyone does it.”) (notes on file with authors). 
 37. Daniel Doktori, What It Means When Law Firms and Startups Give Away Legal 
Documents, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 10, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/01/10/documents-just-
want-to-be-free [https://perma.cc/9ERR-FWQH]. 
 38. See Interview with Attorney III, North Carolina Law Firm II, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 
24, 2016) (notes on file with authors). 
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development represents a classic example of transaction cost 
engineering. 
The creation of such documents is a service that could be 
performed by nonlawyers. Indeed, nonlaw firm legal tech startups such 
as Clerky and Shake (among others) provide prepackaged sets of 
incorporation documents that are not all that different from the 
documents offered by law firms.39 To date, however, law firms do not 
appear to be too worried about these competitors displacing them. As 
one attorney explained, “You can get that document somewhere else 
cheaper. You’re coming to me for my judgment.”40 At the end of the 
day, therefore, law firms hope that startups that use the firm’s 
prepackaged forms at the launch of their business ventures will someday 
hire the firm to advise them in later, more substantial (and, therefore, 
more lucrative) transactional work. 
2.  Standard Forms 
In 2003, the National Venture Capital Association (“NVCA”) 
published a set of “model” documents for venture finance transactions.41 
In the intervening years, these documents have reshaped startup 
lawyering in the United States. Prior to 2003, it was common for law 
firms to have their own semiproprietary set of venture financing forms. 
When two different firms had substantially different forms, contract 
negotiations could be frustratingly slow, as each lawyer sought to 
conform the proposed agreement to “his firm’s” set of forms. The 
NVCA documents sought to address this problem by providing a 
common frame of reference. Once everyone was working off of the same 
basic template, so the argument went, deals could be concluded more 
quickly, and the average legal costs incurred to complete such 
transactions could be substantially reduced.42 
All of the North Carolina lawyers we interviewed believed that the 
NVCA forms had wrought a significant change in market practice—for 
 
 39. See Automatic Legal Paperwork for Startups, CLERKY, https://www.clerky.com 
[https://perma.cc/787R-3KX5]; Create, Sign and Send Legally Binding Agreements in Seconds, 
SHAKE BY LEGALSHIELD, http://www.shakelaw.com [https://perma.cc/M7AB-N28Z]. 
 40. Doktori, supra note 37. 
 41. See Model Legal Documents, NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, http://nvca.org/resources
/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/F76N-JRKV]. This set of model documents now 
includes (1)	a term sheet; (2)	a restated certificate of incorporation; (3)	an investor rights 
agreement; (4)	a stock purchase agreement; (5)	a right of first refusal and co-sale agreement; 
(6)	a voting agreement; (7)	a director indemnification agreement; (8)	a management rights 
letter; and (9)	a model legal opinion. See id. 
 42. See id. 
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them, the release of model documents was a watershed moment. As one 
lawyer observed, 
The NVCA model documents are widely used here [in North 
Carolina]. The largest firms are too proud to use them, but the 
smaller firms use them in their entirety. The model docs have led 
to more standardized terms, which is wonderful service. They 
eliminate a lot of unnecessary negotiation. They create a sense of 
market terms, which is one of the most powerful concepts in 
transactions generally. Fenwick’s surveys and the [American Bar 
Association] Deal Points also help with this. These resources 
allow schleps like me to push back and tell opposing counsel that 
what they’re proposing isn’t “market.” Clients are never happy 
when they’re the schleps. The NVCA forms, by establishing a 
market norm, steer things in certain directions.43 
Another North Carolina attorney emphasized the fact that the NVCA 
forms help to establish “market” norms and discussed their ability to 
reduce transaction costs: 
The NVCA forms have changed our practice. They are really 
helpful. Not everyone has adopted them. I’m not sure why. Some 
firms use their “own” forms. We’re migrating over to NVCA. It 
makes sense for companies. Some say that they are too “pro-
investor.” I disagree. How many companies have a lot of 
bargaining power? These forms help with efficiency at the venture 
rounds.44 
Still, another North Carolina attorney commented that the widespread 
use of the NVCA forms, along with other standardized deal documents, 
had helped to standardize the terms in the venture capital space more 
broadly: 
The biggest difference [in practice over the past twenty years] 
relates to the standardization of legal documents nationally. Series 
Seed. The SAFE. The NVCA docs. Just about every deal starts 
from one of those places. The docs are much more standardized. I 
think that Wilson Sonsini still uses “their” docs, and I’ve heard 
that Cooley does also. Generally speaking, though, no client wants 
 
 43. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm III, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 24, 
2016) (notes on file with authors). 
 44. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm II, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 22, 
2016) (notes on file with authors). 
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to start with docs that are not “market” and that means the 
standard terms.45 
Overall, the North Carolina lawyers viewed the NVCA documents as a 
positive development in the market. 
A number of the New York attorneys took a markedly different 
view of the NVCA forms. Several of these lawyers questioned whether 
the terms set forth in those forms could fairly be characterized as 
“market.” In the words of one New York lawyer, 
Most lawyers outside of a major tech hub need some education on 
startup lawyering forms. They take the NVCA forms and think 
that it’s the gospel. They don’t understand that [the forms] take a 
kitchen sink approach and don’t represent market (particularly 
for companies represented by West Coast or West Coast-style 
startup law firms).46 
Another New York lawyer commented on the benefits of the NVCA 
forms when they were first introduced but was less enthusiastic about 
their current incarnation and how they are being used by many startup 
lawyers today: 
The proliferation of forms has led people to rely on them as 
gospel and allowed them not to really think about what’s actually 
happening in the market. But you have to have the deal flow to 
really be able to do that. We’re fortunate to be able to do that. 
The NVCA forms used to be quite helpful. They weren’t over-the-
top or over-lawyered. They didn’t have every investor bell and 
whistle ever thought of jammed in there. Now they’re really a 
detriment.47 
A different New York attorney noted that, despite the forms being (in 
his view) “investor friendly,” many of his clients were forced to use them 
because many of the term sheets his clients received from investors 
explicitly required using the NVCA’s model financing documents.48 
 
 45. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 19, 2016) 
(notes on file with authors). 
 46. Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm I, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 25, 2016) 
(notes on file with authors). 
 47. Interview with Attorney V, New York Law Firm I, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 14, 
2016) (notes on file with authors). 
 48. See Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm III, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 22, 
2016) (“The NVCA has an investor friendly set of documents, but term sheets include it as a 
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These contrasting perspectives notwithstanding, the development 
and subsequent adoption of the NVCA model documents—along with 
other standard forms—constitutes an example of startup lawyers acting 
as transaction cost engineers. Nearly every attorney we spoke with 
mentioned the relevance of the NVCA documents in their practices, 
highlighting the influence of these forms in shaping the negotiations of 
venture investments irrespective of geography. By attempting to 
establish a baseline of “standard” language for the various terms 
commonly used in these deals, these documents serve as a lingua franca 
that facilitates venture-financing transactions across the United States. 
3.  Nonlegal Advice 
Founders come in many different varieties. In some cases, the 
founder is a serial entrepreneur who already has multiple exits under his 
belt. In other cases, the founder has a brilliant idea and technical chops 
but lacks experience raising venture capital or running a business. In the 
latter case, the startup lawyer will often be called upon to provide 
nonlegal advice to the founder. As one North Carolina lawyer 
explained, “I try to help my clients understand how to negotiate and 
understand the entire financing process. The highest value advice I 
provide is in explaining the dynamics of the transaction.”49 In other 
cases, the startup lawyer will advise founders on timelines and the 
relative merits of prospective investors. In the words of another North 
Carolina lawyer, 
Clients often have unrealistic expectations about how long things 
will take.	.	.	.	It’s typically a months-long process, though angels 
can go faster. Entrepreneurs also tend to underestimate the 
variety of VCs when it comes to value add. Some are going to give 
you money and not much else. Others are going to give advice and 
make introductions. It’s important to set expectations up front. 
Sometimes it’s better to take worse terms if the VC in question is 
going to give you a lot of value add.50 
 
fewer investor-favorable provisions. The North Carolina lawyers, in contrast, have found it 
beneficial to have a single repository of forms that all startup lawyers can utilize. See supra 
notes 43–45 and accompanying text. The main difference in outlook appears to be driven 
mainly by the expectations around what constitutes “market” terms, which for each of them—
depending on how much negotiating leverage their company clients have, on average—is in 
the eye of the beholder. 
 49. Interview with Attorney III, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 38. 
 50. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, supra note 45. 
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Startup lawyers in New York also routinely provide nonlegal advice 
to startups. One New York lawyer likened the relationship to eventually 
becoming a de facto co-founder of the company:  
You’re not viewed as just a lawyer with startups. Large companies 
have an expert for everything. With startups, you’re their partner. 
Unless they’re a serial entrepreneur, they don’t know anything. 
You have to advise them on absolutely everything. Once they 
trust you, they look at you like a cofounder.51  
Another New York attorney commented, 
Startups have something coming up every day that they’re not 
sure about and want to check in with you on. It’s a consigliere 
type of role, a trusted advisor. That includes business issues, 
especially for founders who are engineers or otherwise have no 
business background. They want to know what is “market” on 
business terms. It comes into play with startups much more than if 
you’re representing a Fortune 500 company.52 
On this issue, then, the practice of startup lawyers in North Carolina and 
New York are broadly similar. 
The provision of nonlegal advice to founders and startups helps to 
reduce transaction costs across a range of different matters. By 
explaining the dynamics of the financing transaction, or by explaining 
the relative merits of two different VCs, a startup lawyer reduces the 
information asymmetry between the founder and the investor.53 In this 
respect, the practice of a startup lawyer is again fairly characterized as 
that of a transaction cost engineer who adds value to the transaction by 
reducing these costs. 
B. Startup Lawyers as Reputational Intermediaries 
In addition to their work as transaction cost engineers, startup 
lawyers often serve as reputational intermediaries on behalf of their 
clients. This means that startup lawyers will sometimes “vouch” for 
particularly promising clients by introducing them to potential investors. 
It also means that startup lawyers will occasionally decline to take on 
 
 51. Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm III, supra note 48. 
 52. Interview with Attorney II, New York Law Firm I, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 25, 
2016) (notes on file with authors). 
 53. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm V (Sept. 16, 
2016) (“For new founders (75% of my clients), they need some coaching, tutorial, realistic 
expectation talks. I tell them: ‘Understand when you are negotiating a term sheet with a VC, 
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clients who may reflect poorly upon them. Each of these two forms of 
reputational intermediation is explored below. 
1.  Screening Clients 
In their seminal article on startup lawyering in Silicon Valley, 
Suchman and Cahill argue that Silicon Valley lawyers routinely decline 
to take on certain clients.54 While there are many reasons why a firm 
may decide to take on a client, Suchman and Cahill note that one 
common motivation for doing so in Silicon Valley is to “screen out 
entities that challenge the community’s taken-for-granted assumptions 
or that threaten the community’s social cohesion.”55 These firms often 
refuse to take on a potential client out of a concern that the client would 
reflect poorly on the firm in the client’s dealings with investors.56 
Through this screening process, Suchman and Cahill contend, Silicon 
Valley lawyers establish “normative boundaries” around the venture 
capital community and maintain their status as reliable reputational 
intermediaries.57 
When we asked our interviewees about their client screening 
practice, we received starkly different answers from the attorneys in 
North Carolina and the attorneys in New York. The North Carolina 
lawyers reported that they rarely, if ever, screened their clients in the 
manner described by Suchman and Cahill. One attorney reported that 
he had never turned away a client.58 Several others remarked that they 
would refuse to take on a client if they had serious concerns about 
management’s ethics or character.59 Three attorneys reported that they 
would turn a potential client away if (1)	the company lacked the 
resources to pay up front and (2)	the business plan was so unimpressive 
that they doubted the company would ever be able to raise capital.60 As 
one explained, 
In choosing clients, you have to think like an investor and ask 
yourself whether this is a quality company and if there is a quality 
 
 54. See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 2, at 698–99. 
 55. Id. at 698. 
 56. See id. at 698–99, 698 n.58. 
 57. Id. at 699. 
 58. See Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 36.  
 59. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 44; Interview with 
Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm III, supra note 43; Interview with Attorney II, North 
Carolina Law Firm IV, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 26, 2016). 
 60. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, supra note 45; Interview with 
Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 36; Interview with Attorney II, North 
Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 59.  
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team that is going to have the means to raise funding. If the 
answer is no, then I might not take them on as a client.61 
Significantly, none of the North Carolina lawyers interviewed stated—or 
even implied—that they had ever turned clients away because they 
threatened the community’s taken-for-granted assumptions.62 Nor did 
any of them state that they regularly turned away clients who would 
reflect poorly on the firm in their dealings with investors. The 
overwhelming sentiment from these interviews was that startup lawyers 
in the Research Triangle will generally turn away only those clients who 
are unlikely to be able to pay. This is not to say that these lawyers will 
not try to be helpful. As one explained, 
I will also refer people to more cost-effective service providers.	.	.	. 
If someone needs help with residential real estate, for example, 
I’ll send them to a solo practitioner who is a friend of the firm. Or 
if someone is trying to open a restaurant or other type of lifestyle 
company, I may refer them elsewhere for help with company 
formation. In some cases involving solo entrepreneurs who don’t 
have investors, I’ll even present the option of	.	.	.	using Rocket 
Lawyer or Legal Zoom because an actual lawyer will charge so 
much more.63 
In discussing their policies for screening clients, none of the North 
Carolina lawyers mentioned the policing of community norms or a 
desire to preserve relationships with investors. 
A very different picture emerged from New York, where most of 
the attorneys we interviewed actively screened clients. One of them 
stated his reliance on his existing network of clients to perform the 
screening function: “We decline to take on clients without a referral 
 
 61. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, supra note 45; see also 
Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 36 (“If he is asking us to 
work for free, if he can’t pay us, and if his prospects are bad, then I’m going to say no.”); 
Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 59 (“Generally speaking, 
I may decline to take a client where they don’t have any money and don’t have the ability to 
raise it.”). 
 62. One North Carolina lawyer did say that he has, on occasion, refused to take on a 
client if he believed the client would not be coachable (particularly with regard to the 
valuation the client seeks when raising capital): “Yeah, if their expectations are unrealistic, I’ll 
refuse to take them on. Has to be really wildly unrealistic though. If they expect valuations 
that are wildly unrealistic, it’s a big red flag for me. If they seem like a person who can learn, 
I’ll work with them.” Telephone Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm V, 
supra note 53. This type of refusal appears to have less to do with the client challenging the 
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capital (and pay their legal fees). 
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from someone we know and respect. We only take on clients who aren’t 
referred if they have something really novel.”64 Another New York 
lawyer makes screening determinations based on a number of factors: 
[I will decline representing a company] if it’s not the right 
stage	.	.	.	where the idea may not be quite ready for our rates or 
getting institutional investment. Personality fit is also important, 
as it’s a long-term relationship. Likelihood of getting funded also 
comes into play. We’ll often refer companies to cheaper lawyers 
with the understanding that if they progress, and are able to move 
the idea along, that we can revisit representation as they grow. We 
want the environment to be right on both sides of the equation.65 
Several New York lawyers focused on the company’s business model 
and likelihood of successfully raising capital: 
For us, there’s a sweet spot of tech-oriented companies that will 
ultimately be financed by VC funds. If you’re going to have a 
super successful cottage business that stays an LLC (i.e., a lifestyle 
business), then we’re not the right firm. If we don’t think you will 
be able to raise VC funds, by and large we won’t represent you.66 
Compared to the lawyers in North Carolina, the New York attorneys 
considered a much wider variety of factors—including personality fit and 
connections within the startup community network—when deciding 
whether to serve as a reputational intermediary on behalf of a 
prospective client. 
2.  Making Introductions 
In their capacity as reputational intermediaries, startup lawyers 
regularly introduce their clients to potential investors.67 At first glance, 
 
 64. Interview with Attorney IV, New York Law Firm I, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 14, 
2016) (notes on file with authors). A number of our interviewees in New York stated that they 
are first introduced to many of their company clients by the company’s investors with whom 
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 65. Interview with Attorney II, New York Law Firm I, supra note 52; see also Interview 
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 66. Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm I, supra note 46. Another New York 
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something that might be successful down the road?’	” Interview with Attorney I, New York 
Law Firm III, supra note 48. 
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this might seem somewhat unusual. Outside the venture capital context, 
it is rare for a corporate attorney to introduce clients to potential 
investors; it is a role more typically performed by investment bankers. 
Within the venture capital context, however, such introductions occur 
frequently. One North Carolina attorney explained that introducing 
clients to potential investors is “part and parcel of what it means to be a 
venture attorney.”68 A New York lawyer responded that it “happens all 
the time; it’s the most valuable service that we can provide to a founder, 
I think.”69 Other interviewees stated that “clients are buying access to 
my network”70 and that “if you’re not introducing clients to investors, 
I’m not sure what you’re doing all day.”71 It is common, in other words, 
for startup lawyers to set up meetings between clients and investors in 
the hopes that the latter will choose to invest in the former. 
Although these meetings are frequently arranged, there is no 
guarantee that they will actually lead to investments being made in the 
startup. One North Carolina attorney observed: “Even though I make 
these introductions regularly, they do not happen regularly with success. 
Very few startups get funding.”72 In some cases, clients will hire a 
particular lawyer primarily to obtain an introduction to a particular 
investor or group of investors. In these cases, the lawyer must set the 
client straight. As one North Carolina lawyer explained, 
Some clients come to us expecting that this is our primary role. 
We disabuse them of that notion. No investor will invest in a 
startup because we introduce them. It’s not hard to find investors, 
and while there is probably some slight advantage to being 
referred to them by us, it’s the wrong reason to hire us.73 
Another North Carolina lawyer remarked that he carefully considers 
which clients to introduce to particular investors: “I don’t want to send a 
 
and warranties made by their clients. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 2, at 694–95. We do not 
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startup to an investor when [its] business is well outside the investor’s 
scope. I know one investor, for example, that relies on [business-to-
business] software companies for deal flow, so I will only send 
companies to him that fit this model.”74 
New York lawyers had similar responses. One stated, “It happens 
frequently; we’ll make introductions when it makes sense for both 
parties. We have clients on both sides of the table and try to add value 
where we can with the relationships we have.”75 Another New York 
attorney commented, 
It’s rare that something comes of it, but I’ll make an introduction 
about once every couple months. I do it occasionally, but when 
startups ask about it, I tell them I only do it if it’s a really good 
match. Sometimes the startup’s not even a client and just wants 
my intro to a fund client of mine.76 
One New York attorney told us about a special department of 
nonlawyer finance professionals at his firm that is dedicated to helping 
introduce the firm’s startup clients to investors: 
Oh yeah, [I make introductions] all the time. I view that as part of 
our role. Unless they’re a serial founder, they may not have any 
connections. The intro means a lot more coming from me, when I 
can go to the right partner at the right fund. We even have 
bankers who do this full time in-house. All they do is make 
introductions for our company clients to venture funds (for which 
we don’t take a fee). They’re all MBA former I-bankers who now 
do this full time.77 
One of the hallmarks of startup lawyering, in other words, is a 
willingness to introduce one’s clients to the “right” investors. In so 
doing, startup lawyers serve as reputational intermediaries on behalf of 
their clients. 
C. Startup Lawyers as Regulatory Compliance Experts 
Scholars have also hypothesized that corporate lawyers add value to 
transactions by serving as regulatory compliance experts.78 On one hand, 
a corporate lawyer may provide valuable assistance by advising a client 
on a regulatory issue relating to a specific transaction (such as securities 
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law compliance in connection with a venture financing round).79 This 
sort of regulatory advice is transaction specific. On the other hand, a 
corporate lawyer may provide useful advice to clients that operate in 
highly regulated industries.80 This sort of regulatory advice is client 
specific. In some cases, therefore, a lawyer may add value by virtue of 
the fact that she routinely advises on deals of a certain type. In other 
cases, a lawyer may provide value by virtue of the fact that he routinely 
advises clients that operate in a certain type of regulatory environment. 
In the context of startup lawyering, our interviewees reported that 
they generally do not provide regulatory advice of any stripe to early-
stage biotechnology companies. At first glance, this may seem somewhat 
surprising. Biotechnology companies seeking to produce drugs for 
market, after all, operate in a highly regulated industry. The startup 
lawyer’s regulatory advice is, however, rarely needed because the 
founders in this space are typically quite familiar with the relevant 
regulatory issues. As one North Carolina lawyer explained, 
Most early-stage entrepreneurs in the life sciences arena have 
experience in working through regulatory issues—experience 
gained either during tenure at universities or at former life science 
employers. Through these experiences, the entrepreneurs in many 
cases have extensive contacts in the regulatory arena—consultants 
who they have relationships or former employees who provide 
guidance. It would be rare for a life science entrepreneur to come 
in to the office and start a conversation with a request for advice 
on regulatory matters—if you are in life sciences, there is a 
significant probability that you have had direct contact with 
regulatory specialists. So with respect to life science companies, 
regulatory issues outside of securities matters are not major topics 
of conversation in the early stages of the startup.81 
Another North Carolina lawyer echoed these sentiments: 
Our clients rarely, if ever, ask us to provide advice on FDA 
regulatory issues. During development stage, the regulatory 
function is handled by consultants or employees trained in the 
areas, and legal issues rarely come up. Other clients may have 
need on particular issues in late-stage/pre-approval development 
and most often will use one of the DC-area FDA boutiques,	given 
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their proximity/connection to the regulators. Bottom line is we 
have little or no demand for FDA regulatory advice.82 
With respect to early-stage technology companies, by comparison, 
our interviewees reported that they do occasionally provide regulatory 
advice on privacy and security matters.83 As one North Carolina lawyer 
explained, 
[M]any information technology companies are being formed by 
entrepreneurs with little or no experience in regulatory matters, 
and we do in fact advise on regulatory matters—primarily privacy 
and security. I would also state that this experience would apply to 
young entrepreneurs as well as seasoned veterans—for the 
veterans, there is someone in IT, or legal or regulatory affairs that 
takes care of the security and privacy issues, but little interaction 
with the young or more mature entrepreneurs.84 
In summary, startup lawyers may occasionally add value to certain types 
of early-stage companies by serving as regulatory compliance experts. 
The precise extent of the value added will, however, vary depending 
upon the company and the industry. 
D. Startup Lawyers in Other Roles 
In addition to their roles as transaction cost engineers, reputational 
intermediaries, and regulatory compliance experts, startup lawyers 
occasionally play two additional roles that distinguish them from the 
typical corporate lawyer. First, these attorneys sometimes transmit 
community norms to entrepreneurs. Second, these attorneys frequently 
utilize nontraditional billing schemes that account for the fact that their 
clients will often lack the funds to pay for lawyering services when 
rendered. Each of these two roles is discussed below. 
1.  Transmitters of Norms 
Startup lawyers in Silicon Valley play an important role in 
“educating” clients in community norms.85 One of these norms is that 
venture capital transactions are essentially nonadversarial.86 In this 
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respect, venture capital transactions are understood to be quite different 
from loan agreements. As one North Carolina lawyer explained, 
Where an investment transaction is done right, it’s a partnership. 
It’s different from a loan transaction. The lender has to protect 
itself. An equity investor has less to protect. VC investors have no 
interest in middling returns. There is no reason to focus on 
negative covenants. The structure should be to focus the startup’s 
energy on the returns. There are some zero sum pieces of the deal. 
But mostly the deal is about aligning interests.87 
This perspective is not always shared by founders who have no 
prior experience dealing with venture capitalists. These founders are 
often wary of venture capitalists and are unlikely to view negotiations 
with them as nonadversarial without considerable coaching from their 
attorney. As the same North Carolina lawyer explained, 
In the early 1990s, the predominant notion was that the VCs were 
sharks who want to take over our business. My experience in 
Silicon Valley was totally the opposite. That particular 
misconception seems to have gone away. Some entrepreneurs 
think they need protection, but really, there is a strong spirit of 
partnership. The “us vs. them” attitude is out of place.88 
One New York lawyer who had previously practiced in Silicon Valley 
expressed a similar view, highlighting differences between those two 
tech hubs: 
In California, raising from VCs is so ingrained in the culture that 
nobody questions it. Trying to scale a tech company without VC 
money is pretty hard. In New York, there are fewer funds 
headquartered here, so there’s less of a virtuous cycle and 
relationship-driven culture like there is in the Valley. But I also 
haven’t seen much antipathy towards VCs from our client base. 
That may be self-selecting, though, if we’re representing them.89 
When asked about educating founders about venture investors, one New 
York attorney focused on encouraging his clients to find the right 
balance: 
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Some entrepreneurs think of the VCs as being all knowing and 
defer to them perhaps more than necessary. Others look at VCs as 
being not on the same team as them, as having interests not 
aligned. Neither approach is right for what a startup is in reality: a 
partnership after the investment occurs. The VCs have tons of 
market knowledge and relationships that can really help around 
the table, but at the end of the day, the entrepreneur is bringing a 
lot of value to the equation and shouldn’t feel beholden to the 
VCs or like they’re the executors of the VC’s vision.90 
Another New York attorney also found that sometimes his clients’ 
initial attitude toward investors was too deferential: “Most clients come 
in thinking that it should be a collaborative process with investors, not 
especially antagonistic. In fact, some clients are too trusting of their VCs 
or unwilling to negotiate things they probably should.”91 However, other 
New York lawyers still found that they had to spend significant time 
disabusing their clients of preconceived notions about venture investors: 
I have these conversations all the time. It happens more here in 
New York than in the Valley by a factor of ten or more. Founders 
come in suspicious of vulture capitalists and tell horror stories 
they’ve heard. You have to take them by the hand and explain 
that there are ne’er-do-wells in every industry, but you have to 
find the right people.92 
Another hallmark of attorneys representing startups, therefore, is a 
predisposition to view venture capitalists as potential long-term partners 
rather than adversaries. These startup lawyers often actively work to 
instill these norms in their clients. 
2.  Designers of Innovative Billing Schemes 
Startup lawyers represent founders and startups. In many cases, 
these clients have limited resources.93 In an ideal world, they will—with 
the lawyer’s assistance—raise money from investors. Unless and until 
this money is raised, however, many of these same clients will be unable 
to pay their lawyers.94 Startup lawyers address this challenge in two 
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ways. First, many firms will agree to defer the bills owed to them by their 
startup clients until funding is raised. Second, some firms will take equity 
in the startup client in lieu of cash. 
a. Deferred Billing 
In many cases, startup lawyers will agree to defer fees until their 
client raises capital from an investor. In some cases, the period of 
deferral can be lengthy. One North Carolina lawyer commented that he 
once deferred a client’s fee for twenty years.95 The practice of deferring 
fees is necessary, however, because the clients often lack the ability to 
pay for services when rendered. As one North Carolina attorney stated, 
Normally we will bill startup clients monthly. They will rarely pay 
on time. They’ve got to raise money to pay you. You wind up 
writing off a lot of fees. The larger, more established companies 
pay the bills and make it possible to take on the startup clients, 
some (but not all) of whom will eventually pay.96 
Another North Carolina lawyer observed that 
[a] lot of the work we do puts us at risk of not ever getting paid. 
Sometimes we’ll assume that risk knowingly, as when a serial 
entrepreneur has a really hot startup. We’ll run a tab and count on 
the funding to come through at some point. Other times we’ll just 
do it for pleasure and hope for the best.97 
The New York attorneys told a similar story. One lawyer 
commented on the role of fee deferral in helping early-stage businesses 
grow: “We will defer fees, depending on the situation, up to a certain 
amount until funding or revenue comes in. It makes no sense for clients 
to spend their limited cash on us instead of building the business early 
on.”98 Another attorney remarked, 
We defer billing with most clients, but many of those clients come 
to us with a deal on the table, so we’re confident we’ll get paid 
shortly. Otherwise, we can defer up to a certain amount and have 
a conversation about getting paid above that amount if the legal 
needs are outpacing collections by too much.99 
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A third New York attorney highlighted the risks of deferral and the 
steps taken to minimize those risks: 
We do end up writing off a significant amount of fees for clients 
where we’ve deferred, and they end up not raising money, but we 
try to limit that by selecting only clients we think will raise money, 
and it usually all comes out in the wash. The deferments are also 
limited in time and amount so that it doesn’t become a substantial 
credit risk for us.100 
The risk that a law firm will not be paid by its startup clients is real. 
This risk is much less salient when corporate lawyers represent more 
established business entities because these entities (by definition) have a 
reliable revenue stream. Startup lawyers are, therefore, unique among 
lawyers who represent for-profit corporations in that they face a 
material risk of nonpayment every time they take on a new client. In 
response, these attorneys have devised billing schemes that address this 
problem. 
b. Equity Compensation 
In order to address the risk of nonpayment, some law firms will 
take equity in their startup clients.101 In so doing, these law firms are 
casting their lot with their client. If the startup is a success, the firm will 
participate in the upside. If the startup fails, the firm will likely receive 
nothing. This arrangement recasts the attorney in the role of venture 
capitalist. The attorney must decide whether the client’s prospects are 
good enough to warrant giving up its status as a trade creditor and 
becoming a stockholder. The outcome of this assessment will vary 
depending on the client. As one North Carolina lawyer put it, “I have 
the worst business model in America. Almost no one can afford to pay 
me when they come in. Good teams are worth the risk, though. If I 
really like the deal, I’ll take a small equity stake and defer fees.”102 
Another North Carolina lawyer offered a somewhat more detailed 
explanation of his decision whether to take equity in a client: 
We do take equity in some companies but not significant amounts. 
When and how much depends on the risk profile of the client. 
There is risk in money (fees accrued and written off) and risk in 
lost time. We may give the client a credit of $20–25k for one year 
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in exchange for 1–2% up front. The way these things go, six or 
seven of these companies will be wallpaper. The other three to 
four will hit. We try to cover the fees for the $20–25k we wrote off 
by getting a good return on the ones that hit.103 
It is not, however, always so easy. Just as Groucho Marx once observed 
that he would never want to belong to a club that would admit him as a 
member,104 one North Carolina lawyer pointed out that those clients 
who were willing to give their lawyers an equity stake were—as a 
general matter—not the ones in which the law firms wanted to invest. In 
his words, 
We do take equity in our clients.	.	.	.	There is a deferral of initial 
fees, and we take equity in the company. That being said, the 
practice of taking equity in a client is less ingrained here than in 
some other places. And the best companies don’t want to do it. So 
there’s an adverse selection problem.	.	.	. The clients in which you 
would most like to take equity won’t agree to it.105 
Another North Carolina attorney observed that the willingness of some 
startups to trade their equity for legal services varied by region: 
Very occasionally, we will take equity in a client but usually not. 
This is a big difference between North Carolina and the Valley. If 
a North Carolina lawyer asks for equity, the client is offended. We 
deal with some companies in the Valley that offer equity. Their 
view is that they want us to have a stake in them and have us be 
part of the team. That practice just never took off in North 
Carolina.106 
In North Carolina, therefore, some startup lawyers will agree to take 
equity in their startup clients. This practice is not, however, universally 
followed.107 
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The practices reported by the New York lawyers in this respect 
were very different. One of them expressly invoked the adverse 
selection problem to explain why he does not strike equity-for-services 
arrangements: “Generally the companies that want to pay me in equity, 
there’s a reason they’re cash strapped. The ones that don’t offer that are 
the ones whose equity you want.”108 A second New York lawyer found 
that taking equity in a client made him less rational when deciding 
whether to continue the representation of a failing company: “We don’t 
take equity. It creates weird incentives to keep working for businesses 
that might not warrant it. We still occasionally see some companies out 
West that had previous law firms that took equity for services (with 
vesting).”109 A third New York attorney believes the practice of 
investing cash in clients better aligns the attorney and client than does 
taking equity in exchange for legal services: 
If we were good at picking the winners and losers, we’d be 
investors full-time. We’re better at following smart investors (by 
investing small amounts in those rounds). I also never want to 
negotiate with my clients. I never want them to feel like we’re 
opposite them.110 
Still, another New York lawyer agreed that it was better for lawyers to 
pay cash for any equity they receive but for a different reason: 
[W]e don’t think it’s appropriate to crowd out a startup’s cap table 
for no money. We advise clients not to freely give away their 
equity, and that should include giving it to us. We will invest in a 
client’s early-stage rounds at the same price and on the same 
terms as a VC, but in small amounts.111 
There are, in short, divergent practices between startup lawyers in New 
York City and North Carolina when it comes to taking equity in startup 
clients in lieu of cash for legal services rendered. 
III.  THE MIGRATION OF WEST COAST NORMS 
There exist several noteworthy differences in the way that startup 
lawyers practice in different parts of the country. In North Carolina, 
startup lawyers rarely screen their clients on the basis of any criteria 
other than the ability to pay for services rendered. In New York and 
Silicon Valley, by contrast, startup lawyers routinely screen their clients 
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based on various criteria. In New York, and increasingly in Silicon 
Valley, startup lawyers are not taking equity in their clients in exchange 
for services, though many will invest cash in select clients in connection 
with financing rounds led by prominent venture investors. In North 
Carolina, by comparison, it is more common for startup lawyers to take 
equity in their clients when they agree to represent them. These 
differences suggest that significant regional variations in startup 
lawyering practice may still exist. 
How can one explain these variations? For decades, scholars and 
industry observers found vastly different approaches to startup investing 
and lawyering based on geography, with significant variations in practice 
correlated with the locations of the startup, the VCs, and their respective 
lawyers.112 They framed these differences in terms of a dichotomy: West 
Coast vs. East Coast—i.e., Silicon Valley vs. Boston, the two primary 
tech hubs for much of the history of venture capital.113 As startup 
ecosystems across the country have continued to develop and mature, 
we believe that this dichotomy may no longer adequately describe the 
variations we observed in startup lawyering in different geographical 
regions. 
To help explain why, it may be instructive to briefly consider the 
shifting landscape of venture capital contract terms. Scholars and 
practitioners alike have long maintained that geography and culture play 
an important role when it comes to shaping the terms of venture capital 
contracts.114 The conventional wisdom explaining the East Coast/West 
Coast divide held that contracts on the West Coast were more favorable 
to the company because the Silicon Valley VCs viewed their relationship 
with portfolio companies as a “partnership[.]”115 Contracts on the East 
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Coast, by contrast, were said to contain deal terms that were less 
favorable to the company because East Coast VCs took a more “banker-
like” approach to their portfolio companies.116 
There is evidence to suggest, however, that repeated exposure to 
companies in Silicon Valley resulted in East Coast VCs adopting more 
company-friendly deal terms in subsequent deals.117 The more deals that 
East Coast VCs did in Silicon Valley, in other words, the more their deal 
terms came to resemble the terms used by their counterparts on the 
West Coast. 
Our research indicates that a similar effect may occur when it comes 
to startup lawyering practices—that West Coast startup lawyering 
practices have increasingly migrated to other startup ecosystems, 
resulting in the decreasing relevance of the East Coast/West Coast 
dichotomy. The key distinction for lawyering practice in the startup 
space today relies less on geography and more on whether a lawyer is 
what we would call a “startup law aficionado”—someone who is in-the-
know and steeped in startup community norms.118 Startup law 
aficionados, in our view, are lawyers that are primarily in the business of 
representing venture-backed startups and who see significant startup 
deal flow, as opposed to lawyers that practice on the periphery of startup 
ecosystems, only occasionally representing early-stage businesses, angel 
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investors, or nontraditional VC investors. Startup law aficionados can be 
found in any geographical region, though they tend to be clustered in 
technology hubs. Silicon Valley is still such a center of gravity in the 
startup world that startup law aficionados outside the Bay Area will 
inevitably come into contact with Silicon Valley startup lawyers and 
venture investors. As this occurs, the lawyering practices of startup law 
aficionados outside of Silicon Valley increasingly reflect those of their 
counterparts in Silicon Valley—and we predict that repeated exposure 
will only increase the effect. 
One possible explanation for the greater degree of convergence 
with Silicon Valley practices that we found in New York as compared 
with the Research Triangle, therefore, is that startup practice in New 
York is increasingly dominated by law firms with strong ties to Silicon 
Valley. Startup legal practice in North Carolina, by comparison, is more 
isolated from Silicon Valley, dominated by firms that are based in the 
Southeast. While these firms employ a number of lawyers who cut their 
teeth at firms in Silicon Valley, they also employ a great many lawyers 
who did not. This latter group of lawyers may, therefore, be less steeped 
in West Coast norms than those who began their practice on the West 
Coast or those who regularly interact with West Coast lawyers and 
investors. As a result, the startup lawyers in New York and the Research 
Triangle may simply be at different stages along the path of convergence 
with Silicon Valley startup lawyering practices and norms. 
CONCLUSION 
In the technology world, it is common to assign version numbers to 
software upgrades. These numbers generally correspond to new 
developments in the software and enable end users to identify the most 
up-to-date version of a particular program. In the realm of startup 
lawyering, there is no versioning equivalent, which means the evolution 
of attorney practice is more difficult to track. To the extent that trends 
are discernible, however, it would appear that the act of providing legal 
services to early-stage technology companies outside of Silicon Valley 
today is different in a number of respects from the act of providing 
similar services to companies within Silicon Valley in the early 1990s. At 
the same time, the work of a startup lawyer retains many of the core 
features that defined this earlier era. The advent of Startup Lawyering 
2.0 thus represents a difference in degree—rather than a difference in 
kind—from the era that preceded it. 
